1 Feeny D, Berkes F, McCay B,
Acheson J, op.cit., p. 3.
5 Feeny D, Berkes F, McCay B,
Acheson J ‘The Benefits of the commons’ 1989 Nature Vol. 340, p. 91-93.
6 Ostrom E ‘Issues of Definition and
Theory: Some conclusions and hypotheses’ 1986 National Research Council,
Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, p. 604.
7 Feeny D, Berkes F, McCay B,
Acheson J, op. cit., p. 4.
8 Regier H A, Grima A P ‘Fishery
Reserve Allocation: An Explanatory Essay’ 1985 Canadian Journal of Fisheries
and Aquatic Sciences Vol. 42, p. 845-859.
9 Olson M, The Logic of Collective
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press, 20th
Edition, 1965), p. 28.
10 Ostrom E ‘Tragedy of the Commons’
2008 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd Edition,
available at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_T000193
(last access: 29 January 2018).
14 National Research Council,
Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management (National
Academy Press, 1986).
15 McCay B, Acheson J, The Question
of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources (University of
Arizona Press, 1987).
16 Ostrom E, Governing the Commons:
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University
18 Feeny D, Berkes F, McCay B,
Acheson J, op. cit., p. 6.
21 McCay B ‘The Culture of the
Commoners. Historical Observations on Old and New World Fisheries’ 1987 The
Question of the Commons, p. 195-216.
22 Thompson F P, Whigs and Hunters
23 Feeny D, Berkes F, McCay B,
Acheson J, op. cit., p. 7.
25 Jodha N S ‘A Case Study of
Degradation of Common Property Resources in India’ 1987 Land Degradation and
Society, p. 186-204
26 Ostrom E ‘Institutional
Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending Approaches’
1987 The Question of the Commons, p. 250-265.
27 Feeny D, Berkes F, McCay B,
Acheson J, op. cit., p. 8.
28 Arnold J, Campbell J ‘Collective
Management of Hill Forests in Nepal: The Community Forestry Development
Project’ 1986 Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource
Management, p. 425-454.
30 Feeny D, Berkes F, McCay B,
Acheson J, op. cit., p. 9.
exclusivity of governmental institutions of the resource often sufficed to
provide acceptable exclusion, but then again problems might be arose in the
light of exclusion and not necessarily fixed simply just declared the
respective common property is owned by the government.27
Government nationalized forest in Nepal in 195728 convert
communal forest into de jure
governmental property, nonetheless the result was similar to the creation of de facto open access. Villagers whose
control of nearby forests were lost because of the encouragements of law on
capturing the offenders which leads to deforestation accelerated.29 The
reason of Hardin’s argument of the Tragedy of the Commons is we should not see
sustainable management of common property and control of access under other
than private or state property.30
Exclusion is not always successful but it is feasible, moreover private
property or state owned property is not always provide a successful control of
access of uses.
never argued the probability of exclusion for communal property. Exclusion on
this matters mean that the power to limit access for people who are not a
member of that respective community. Newfound evidence proposes the success of
communal property exclusion is the rule itself not the exception.23 Given
the pressure on the resource because of human population growth, technology,
economic, new market prospect, might be the reason of the failure of
communal-property system, especially the role of population growth.24
Moreover, communal property fail to contribute for control of access also
because of other reasons. Much more on this failures often associated with
resources by politically powerful group or any other aspects such as land
reform which will interrupt existing communal property system.25 In
addition, social and political characteristics of the users of the resource and
they relation to much larger political power shall affect the ability of
smaller communities to organize and manage their common resources.26
enforcement for private property rights often provide institutional
arrangements which resulted in successful exclusion.19 Private
property rights might be not sufficiently accurate for solving the exclusion
problem. The enforcement problem including private property may arise.
Regarding common-property resources, which by definition is the main exclusion problems
are the cost for enforcing.20 Some of
scholars such as McCay21 and
found that well recognized de jure
often violated by the poachers. In addition to the community concerns private
property rights often affects the cost of enforcement.
mentioned above, there are evidences which support Hardin’s prediction
regarding degradation due to the failure to govern access to resources even as
open access. Classic cases of the historical discrepancy for example mass whale
hunting back in 17th century across the world.18 In other
cases the tragedy occurred only after open access situations were governed by
authorized institutions which resulted consequences in the light of devastation
of communal commons.
1.A. Exclusion and Control of Access
rules which creates to authorized specific user and rights and duties of
authorized users creates a public good, all users will be benefited from this
public good whether they contribute or not.9 Meanwhile
many of the main problems are users got into dilemmatic choices whereas affects
negative externalities which is not consistent with traditional theory which
users can resolve a second-level dilemma when they are already predicted to be
unlikely able to resolve the social dilemma.10 Since
Hardin’s predictions and a lot of open access resources resulted in devastating
overgraze even destruction, many scholars and governmental institutions relied
to the more traditional analysis to justify the need for regulating control of
all common resources.11 Scholars
have a tendency to search for certainty and want to examine whether tragedy of
the common is either right or wrong.12 Hardin’s
theory is supported by several evidences, there are many situations whereas the
tragedy of the commons occurred around the world and still continues.13 Multiple
studies conducted by National Research Council14, McCay
stipulated that users have overcome social dilemma mentioned above to made
institutions to regulate their own resources. Nevertheless, the users would
find another way to regulate themselves, the main principles for long-lasting,
vigorous, institutional arrangements to regulate common-pool resources has been
property or governed by state is the rights to the resource exclusively only
for the government to exploit or make decisions regarding the access to the resources.
The category of state property also might referring to property to general
community has access and use rights equally. The nature of the state property
regime also unlike private property which has coercive enforcement.
property is a resource held by identifiable community or independent users.
Often they exclude people who is not a part of their community regulated by the
community themselves. Within the community, the rights is not considered as
exclusive nor transferable because the rights is equal within the community.
The rights of the community might be legally acknowledged legally.
property is the rights to exclude others from using the resources and regulate
the resource for themselves. Private property rights are acknowledged and
heavily regulated by government. Dissimilar to open access, private property
often exclusive and can be transferred.8 For
example privately owned farm, forest, or field.
access is when there is no property rights. The access is open for everyone and
no regulation which limits the access. For example, atmospheric resources or
open water fishery.
Ostrom highlighted the importance of the difference between the nature of resources
and the property-rights under the definition of class of resources as
common-pool resources.6 In order
to simplify analysis, there are four categories of property rights in the
lights of common-property resources:7
basic characteristic of common-property resources is rivalry whereas capability
of the user to subtracting from the surplus of other users.3 Although
every users is cooperating to each other to improve the productivity of the
resources, the nature of the resource itself already in the level of
exploitation by other user which affects their ability to gain surplus.
Subtractability is the source of potential discrepancy between individual and
Therefore, common-property resource can be defined as a class of resources for
which control of access or exclusion and shared use involve rivalry or
resources have two characteristics, the first is control of access whereas
physical nature of the resource is excludability by users might be expensive or
Some resources considered to have some problem to access such as wildlife,
ground water, or fish as well as regulating those resources. This
characteristic became much more problem for large bodies of water, atmospheric
resources, or radio bands.2
1. Common-Property Resources
Tragedy of the Commons