his this, based on the all-or-nothing viewhis this, based on the all-or-nothing view

his has led me to believe that perhaps the problem with personal identity is not fact or truth, but rather, an issue of grammar, or semantics. In fact, in Hume’s Treatise, he concludes that the questions we have about personal identity are not really philosophical, but are regarded as grammatical matters (262). Similarly, Shoemaker includes in the essay that Parfit states “it is 3 / 3because of the way we talk” that persons become subjects. Like Hume’s ‘perceptions,’ Parfit also suggested that logically, entities construct persons, and these entities are not necessarily ‘adjectival’ on mental subjects.  Now, if we look back at Parfit’s ‘Combined Spectrum’ we are met with the question “will this person still be me?” Parfit would respond that this is an empty question, requiring us to arbitrarily choose a point in the spectrum, nevertheless, the choice is arbitrary. Although Shoemaker does not mention Parfit’s “4 options” and how the answer to the hypothetical identitcal triplets is the claim that “the person survives as both” I believe, emphasizes the role language plays in our attempt to understand personal identity.  This is because Parfit’s claim, then, is that under normal (non-branching) conditions, psychological continuity can provide a criterion of personal identity. If we deny this, based on the all-or-nothing view of identity, then Parfit thinks we must abandon the language of identity. We would then speak in a new way, regarding our new descriptions as having the same significance as identity by replacing ‘personal identity’ with ‘survival.’ From Parfit’s example above, we can see why personal identity could be insufficient to describe this case. Furthermore, each body would have a separate history, leading to the possibility that one body might kill the other. Would we then say he killed himself, was then convicted of his own murder, and died again in prison 40 years later? The standard way we talk about persons does not allow for such cases. It seems, then, that we must either change our concept of persons to include these cases, or develop a new way of describing these cases that does not imply identity. This is exactly what Parfit champions in his idea of survival.