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The Palestinian Central Council, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s second-highest decision-making body, declared last week that the U.S. administration “has lost its eligibility to function as a mediator and sponsor of the peace process.” The council called on the PLO Executive Committee, the body with the power to implement policy decisions, to “work to reverse” the Trump administration’s declaration of Jerusalem of Israel’s capital and find “other international pathways” to sponsor the Palestinian cause. While the Executive Committee is unlikely to act upon some of the Central Council’s more ambitious recommendations – such as the wholesale suspension of the Oslo Accords – it does seem to be considering other avenues for mediation. In a speech given before the Central Council, PLO Chairman and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas explained that the Palestinians “would be open to a similar negotiations format to the P5+1 and Iran nuclear negotiations.” Abbas’s statement begs the question: Can a P5+1 arrangement work for the Israeli-Palestinian impasse?The P5+1 refers to the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members – the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China – plus Germany. In 2015, these six powers struck an agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, by which Tehran would dismantle much of its nuclear program and grant international inspectors access to sensitive sites in exchange for the lifting of U.S., EU, and UN sanctions. Multi-party mediation can find success in certain contexts, as it did in Iran. The P5+1 states shared an interest in rolling back Iran’s nuclear program and were willing to exert significant leverage to do so. The United States, hoping to seize a perceived opening with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, proved willing to ease up on foreign policy priorities in Syria and Ukraine to ensure Russia’s cooperation. Russia, for its part, saw preventing the emergence of a nuclear power near its borders as a vital security interest. China, the U.K., Germany, and France found the appeal of a new trade and energy partner hard to resist. And Iran, under pressure fromeconomic sanctions, felt compelled to participate to avoid a domestic political crisis and re-engage in the global economy. Shared interest, coupled with the tailored application of leverage, drove cooperation.